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TORT LIABILITY OF HOSPITALS IN NEW YORK
Sidney S. Bobb6*
It now appears to be the established law of New York that hospitals,
whether profit-making or charitable, are immune from liability for the
negligent treatment of patients by doctors, internes and nurses in their
general employ.' Unlike other employers, hospitals have been freed from
the responsibility of respondeat superior, which has been held inapplicable in the determination of liability for negligence in the treatment and
care of patients.' The purpose of this article is to probe into the legal
and social basis of charitable tort liability and to question its current application.
MacDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital3 is usually cited as
the earliest leading case in the development of the theory of tort immunity for charitable institutions. In that case, a charity patient had
been operated upon negligently by a student doctor. The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts decided that the patient could not hold the
hospital liable, reasoning that the public and private donations which
supported the charitable hospitals constituted a trust fund which could
not be thus despoiled. The court reached this conclusion in reliance on
the supposed authority of an English decision, Holliday v. St.
Leonard's,4 which was cited for the broad proposition that a charity
will not be held liable for the negligence of an agent. The Massachusetts*
court deciding the MacDonald case neglected to observe, however, that
the Holliday case had been expressly and vigorously overruled in a subsequent unanimous decision by the House of Lords.'
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 439, for biographical data.
1 Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 385 (1st

Dep't 1950), aff'd without opinion, 302 N. Y. 870, 100 N. E. 2d 51 (1951); Roth v. Beth
El Hospital, Inc., 110 N.Y.S. 2d 583 (2d Dep't 1952).
2 See Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); Phillips v.
Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924).
3 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
4 11 C. B. H. S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
The court in the Holliday case
relied to a considerable extent on the earlier English case of Duncan v. Findlater,
6 Cl. & Fin. 894 (1839) but neither of these cases was directly in point. Both cases involved an action against trustees who were gratuitously administering public works, for
injuries sustained because of the negligence of the men employed on the projects. No
trust funds were available to pay damages and the court held that the trustees were not
to be held personally liable since they were not personally at fault.
5 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 11 H. L. Cas. 686 (1866). The law of
England today makes a charity liable for the negligence of its servants in the same
way as private individuals would be under similar circumstances. See Gold v. Essex County
Council, [19421 2 K.B. 293, 2 All Eng. Rep. 237.
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Until the MacDonald decision, rendered in 1876, no appellate court
in the United States seems to have treated hospitals or charities as an
exception to the general rule of respondeat superior. After the MacDonald decision, courts, though differing with the grounds of that decision, felt impelled to reach a like conclusion, and New York courts
proved no exception. Before considering the development of the law in
New York on this point, however, it is interesting and necessary to consider the treatment accorded the question by other states.
The reason given for exempting the hospital from liability in the
MacDonald case was that the public and private donations received by
the charitable hospital constituted a trust fund which could not be despoiled by tort claims arising out of negligence of its agents.' Other
states accepted this trust fund theory,' and another English case, Heriot's
Hospital v. Ross," was frequently mentioned as supporting precedent. 9
Again, the English decision should not have been used as controlling
authority, for the plaintiff in the Heriot's Hospital case was not suing
for negligence at all, but was claiming damages on the ground that at
the time when he qualified as a beneficiary of the trust fund, he had
been improperly excluded from the benefits thereof. In adopting this
rule of total immunity under the trust fund theory, courts generally disregarded the relationship of the claimant to the institution, and recovery
was denied even to employees and third parties."°
The implausibility of the trust fund logic encouraged some courts
to search for other supporting theories, and the next step in the evolution
of the law on this subject is found in a federal case, Union Pacific Railroad v. Artist." There, the charity was a hospital maintained in part
6 Massachusetts has also held the trust fund immune to claims arising out of the negligence of its trustees. See Roosen v. Peter Brent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126
N. E. 392 (1920).
7 Forydice & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S. W.
155 (1906); Jackson v. Atlanta Goodwill Industries, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 425, 167 S. E. 702
(1933); Webb v. Vought, 127 Kan. 799, 275 Pac. 170 (1929); Emery v. Jewish Hospital
Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921); Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1884);
Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S. W. 2d 615 (1946); Gregory v. Salem
General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944); Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa.
624, 15 At. 553 (1888).
8 12 Cl. & Fin. 507 (1846). For a valuable discussion of this case, see note in 14
A. L. R. 572, 574 (1921).
9 See Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1884); Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa.
624, 15 Adt. 553 (1888).
1 See cases cited in note 7. See also, Exman v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass.
299, 170 N. E. 43 (1930); Loeffier v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130
Md. 265, 100 AtI. 301 (1917).
11 60 Fed. 365 (1894).
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by a railroad company for the benefit of its employees. A portion of a
tube had been left in plaintiff's leg, and he claimed that this was the
result of malpractice by a paid physician and the attendants in the hospital. Recovery was denied to the plaintiff for a variety of reasons, including the trust fund theory, but the most influential reason advanced
by the court was contained in the following quotation:
Moreover the corporations or individuals that administer such trusts
must after all leave the treatment of the patients to the superior knowledge
and skill of the physicians. They cannot direct the latter, as the master
may ordinarily direct the servant, what to do, and how to do it. If they
did so, the physicians would be bound to exercise their own superior
skill and better judgment, and to disobey their
employer as, in their
2
opinion, the welfare of the patients required it.'

This argument, rejecting the applicability of respondeat superior to
charitable hospitals, contains at least one apparent fallacy. Exemption'
from the doctrine for the reason of superior knowledge and skill of the
servant has never been applied in other situations. Such a reason is
foreign to the very origins of the rule of respondeat superior. The first
important case to apply that rule was one in which the owner of a ship
was held responsible for the negligence of the ship's master, 3 an occupation which certainly requires great skill and independent exercise
of judgment.
The words of Chief Justice Shaw in an early Massachusetts case
dealing with respondeat superior should be an adequate reminder of the
basis of the doctrine:
This rule is obviously founded on the great principle of social duty, that
every man in the management of his own affairs, whether by himself or
by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them as not to injure another;
and if he does not, and another thereby sustains damage, he shall answer
for it. If done by a servant, in the course of his employment, and acting
within the scope of his authority, it is considered, in contemplation of law,
so far the act of the master that the latter shall be answerable civiliter....
The maxim respondeat superior is adopted in that case, from general considerations of policy and security .... 14
To exempt the master from liability merely because the servant must
exercise initiative and judgment in the skilled practice of his occupation
would be to qualify the doctrine to the point of annihilation.
Actually, this argument was advanced in the Union Pacific opinion as
but a lame support for the principle that total exemption from liability
should be allowed because of the charitable nature of the institution.
Thus:
12 Id. at 367.

13 Boson v. Sandford, 2 Salk. 440 (1691).
14 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Ry., 4 Met. 49 (Mass. 1842).
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If one contracts to treat a patient in a hospital-and out of it for that
matter-for any disease or injury, he undoubtedly becomes liable for any
injury suffered by the patient through the carelessness of the physicians
or attendants he employs to carry out the contract. If one undertakes
to treat such a patient for the purpose of making profit thereby, the law
implies the contract to treat him carefully and skillfully and holds him
liable for the carelessness of the physicians and attendants he furnishes.
But this doctrine of respondeat superior has no just application where
one voluntarily aids in establishing or maintaining a hospital without
expectation of pecuniary profit. 5 (Emphasis added.)
A prior Pennsylvania decision had expressed similar sentiments:
[To allow a recovery] would be carrying the doctrine of respondeat
superior to an unreasonable and dangerou5 length. The doctrine is at
best ... a hard rule. I trust and believe it will never be extended to the
sweeping away of public charities ....16
Such statements ignore the obligation generally assumed by one who
undertakes the performance of a duty, 7 and the decision of nonliability is based on an entirely different ground from that of the superior knowledge and skill of the attending physician. That knowledge
and skill, after all, is the same whether the hospital be run for profit ox
chaxity.
Other courts suggested that respondeat superior should not be applied
to charitable institutions on the ground that the doctrine was intended
only to make corporations and employers liable foracts of their servants
from which they might derive a benefit in the sense of personal and
private gain.' Upon analysis, these various arguments seem to lack a
logical legal basis and become rationalizations indulged in by the courts
to sustain a priori conclusions. Frequently the simple reason behind
these rationalizations is the public policy of the jurisdiction to foster and
encourage charitable institutions; but the following quotation from a
decision by a Rhode Island court shows that public policy can be given
as a reason for liability as well as immunity:
Is it not better and safer for the court to follow out the analogies of the
law, and then if the legislature is of the opinion that public policy de15 Union Pacific R. R. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365, 367 (1894).
16 Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 647, 15 Atl. 553, 557 (1888).
17 See Murtha v. N. Y. Homeopathic Hospital, 228 N. Y. 183, 186, 126 N. E. 722
(1920) where Cardozo, J. commented on the defendant's liability by saying: "It set its
hand to the task, and must answer for the doing." See also Glanzer v. Shepherd, 233
N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
18 See Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895); Taylor v.
Protestant Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911); Morrison v. Henke,
165 Wis. 166, 160 N. W. 173 (1916).
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mands a limitation of the liability, it is in its power to interfere and grant
an entire or partial exemption. 19
Another approach to the problem was suggested by a Michigan court
in Downes v. HarperHospital.0 There, a charitable hospital was charged
with having negligently failed to prevent an insane person from committing suicide. Exemption was granted for the reasons: (1) the trust
fund doctrine (2) the policy consideration that the recipient of charitable benefits should not be permitted to sue his benefactor who was
attempting to promote the public good. The court said:
[By permitting a recovery] the trust fund might be entirely destroyed and
diverted from the purpose for which the donor gave it. Charitable bequests cannot be thus thwarted by negligence for which the donor is in
no way responsible. . . . Those voluntarily accepting the benefit of a
charity accept it upon this condition.... 21
In a subsequent Michigan case, 22 the court was presented with the question of the liability of a charity to one not a beneficiary, a person who
was injured while working on a church building. The church was held
liable, but in a dictum the court reaffirmed the theory that aobeneficiary
cannot sue the charity. An example of the harshness of this rule is seen
in still another Michigan cases where a hospital was held not liable
to a father for its negligence in giving his baby to the wrong person.
Here, compensation had been made for the benefits conferred by the
charity-the father had paid a dollar a day for the care of his baby, but
the paying patient was considered a beneficiary. Again the public policy
argument is given considerable weight in denying recovery to a beneficiary , but in determining public policy courts should be reminded of
19 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 435 (1879). The legislature of Rhode
Island later enacted a statute of general exemption of charitable hospitals. R. I. Gen.
Laws 1909, c. 213. For decisions using public policy as a ground for immunity, see Hearns
v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1916); Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital,
355 Mo. 436, 196 S. W. 2d 615 (1946); Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc., 218
Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476 (1935).
20 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894). See also Wilcox v. Idaho Falls L. D. S. Hospital,
59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849 (1938); St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stene, 195 Ind. 350, 144
N. E. 537 (1924); Herndon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1914); Weiss v.
Swedish Hospital, 16 Wash. 2d 446, 133 P. 2d 978 (1943).
21 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894).
Thus, the insane patient was deemed to have
contracted away the hospital's liability.
22 Bruce v. Central Methodist Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951 (1907).
23 Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W, 137 (1933).
24 See, for example, Weston's Administratrix v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131
Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 (1921) where the court denied recovery to a paying patient whose
baby was killed as a result of a nurse's negligence on the grounds of public policy.
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Professor Scott's statement: "The [charitable] institution should be
just before it is generous."'
Closely connected to the Michigan doctrine denying the right of a
beneficiary to sue is the theory of implied waiver, a fictional concept
which has been expressed as follows:
One who accepts the benefit either of a public or a private charity enters
into a relation which exempts the benefactor from liability for the negligence of his servants in administering the charity ....26
The parallel was drawn between such a case and that of the Good Samaritan who takes a wounded stranger to his home for surgical care.
It was thought intolerable that such a benefactor should be held personally liable for the negligence of his servant in caring for the stranger; but
certainly there is a plain distinction between taking a stranger into a
private home and establishing an institution for rendering professional
care and treatment. It is difficult to imagine how such an assumption
of risk by a beneficiary is evidenced, particularly where the patient is
delirious, unconscious, incompetent or simply does not know what a
waiver is. For this reason, the logic of the theory has justifiably been
criticized.2"
The doctrine of complete immunity gained many adherents in the
early stages of its development, but from the very beginning at least
one voice was raised against it, although somewhat equivocally, i.e.,
Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital." The hospital was held liable to a
paying patient for the negligence of an interne who performed an operation himself instead of calling in the regular surgeon. The court
defended a public policy favoring liability by saying:
The public is doubtless interested in the maintenance of a great public
charity such as the Rhode Island Hospital; but it also has an interest
in obliging every person and every corporation which undertakes the
performance of a duty to perform it carefully....so
25 3 Sconr, TRusTs 2150 (1939).
26 Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294, 303 (1st Cir. 1901).
See
also Wilcox v. Idaho Falls L. D. S. Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849 (1938); Cook v.
John E. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874 (1918).
27 Thus, the doctor who as a "Good Samaritan" gives free treatment is nevertheless
chargeablq with responsibility for his own negligence. Du Bois v. Decker, 130 N. Y. 325,
29 N. E. 313 (1891).
28 Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940); Mulliner
v. Evangelicher Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920); Welch v.
Hospital, 90 N. H. 337 (1939); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt.
145, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950); Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798
(1939).
2 12 R. I. 411 (1879).
30 Id. at 425.
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The court rejected the trust fund and implied waiver theories and held
the charity subject to the doctrine of respondeat superior,31 not, however, because of the interne's negligence in performing the operation,
but because he had negligently failed to call in a surgeon to perform a
difficult operation. It took pains to point out that the hospital would
not have been liable for the malpractice of the interne in performing
minor acts of surgery, or of the physician, inasmuch as the hospital
merely undertook to procure their services for the patient, and not to
act as their master. Yet if the interne or house doctor was on the paid
staff of the hospital, it would seem wholly unrealistic to say that they
were not the servants of the hospital. Unfortunately, however, this
broad and unwarranted generalization as to facts was later to be adopted
in New York and elsewhere as stating fixed principles of law.
Those states which favor immunity rely on firmly-entrenched precedent, but recent case law,32 decided in jurisdictions where the problem was one of first instance, point to an increasing trend away from such
immunity. Leading text-writers have long favored the doctrine of
liability.33
With this background the development of theories regarding the tort
liability of charitable institutions in New York may be more meaningful.
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK LAW ON TORT LIABILITY

The first case to reach the New York Court of Appeals was Hordern
v. Salvation Army, and it held that the charity was liable to an employee for the negligence of a fellow servant. The employee was not
considered a beneficiary by the court. The defense argued that there
was no liability because the rule of respondeat superior had no relation
to a charity. The Hordern case might have been disposed of on the basis
of an earlier decision,35 but, instead, the Court proceeded to re-examine
31 See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Mcnerny v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 122 Minn. 10, 141 N. W. 837 (1913); City of Shawnee v. Roush,
101 Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354 (1924).
32 See note 28. See also President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130
F. 2d 810 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
33 3 ScoTr, TRusTs § 402 (1939); 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 401 (1935);
HARPER, TORTS § 294 (1933); PROSsER, ToRTs 1079 (1941). See also Feezer, The Tort
Liability of Charities, 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 191 (1928).
34 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910); accord, Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation

of Long Island, 203 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E. 406 (1911) (plaintiff was run over by defendant's
ambulance--judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a new trial ordered because of failure
to prove that the ambulance driver was an employee of the defendant).
35 See Rector of Church v. Burkhardt, 3 Hill. 193 (N. Y. 1842) where the N. Y. Supreme Court held a religious corporation liable for injuries received by a pedestrian from
a falling wall. This decision had never been questioned and had been thought of as conclusive against the doctrine of total immunity.
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the cases in other states and first concluded that the trust fund doctrine
and the theory of complete charitable immunity should not prevail. On
this point, the court remarked:
The doctrine that the will of an individual shall exempt either person
or property from the operation of general laws is inconsistent with the
fundamental idea of government. It permits the will of the subject to
nullify the will of the people. Nor can I conceive any ground upon which
a court can hold that effect can be given to that will when it relates to
property devised or conveyed for the purpose of a charitable trust....s6
Although the question of the right of a beneficiary of the charity to sue
was not involved in the Hordern case, the court nevertheless took occasion to comment on that situation by way of dictum, and said:
• . . [T]he immunity of charitable corporations for the torts of their
trustees or servants has been made dependent on the relation that the
plaintiff bore to the corporation... [and all jurisdictions recognized] that
the beneficiary of a charitable trust may not hold the corporation liable
for the
neglect of its servants. This is unquestionably the law of this
37
state.

In addition to the cited authorities, which the Court believed had made
that proposition "unquestionably the law of this state," the Court also
relied on the reasoning adopted by the Powers case,38 thereby accepting
the theory of implied waiver. None of the cited authorities relied upon
in the Hordern case was a decision of the Court of Appeals, and, even
more striking, each of the cases thus relied upon was, in the last analysis,
based upon authorities in other states upholding the very doctrine which
the Court of Appeals was in the act of repudiating-the trust fund
doctrine.
The next link in the developing chaini was the case of Schloendorff v.
New York Hospital. There, plaintiff sustained serious injuries because
of an unauthorized operation performed by a voluntary, visiting surgeon,
and it was alleged that defendant's nurses, as well as the hospital's house
doctor, participated in the tort by knowingly preparing plaintiff for the
unlawful operation. Judgment was awarded in favor of the defendant,
the Court of Appeals saying:
Certain principles of law governing the rights and duties of hospitals when
86 Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 239, 92 N. E. 626, 628 (1910).
37 Id. at 237, 92 N. E. at 627. As authority for this statement, the court cited Collins
v. N. Y. Post Graduate Medical School, 59 App. Div. 63, 69 N. Y. Supp. 106 (2d Dep't
1901); Joel v. The Woman's Hospital, 89 Hun 73, 35 N.Y. Supp. 37 (2d Dep't 1894);
Haoi v. Missionary Society of the Most Holy Redeemer, 6 Misc. 281, 26 N.Y. Supp. 868
(C. P. 1893).
38 See note 26 supra.
39 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
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maintained as charitable institutions have, after much discussion, become
no longer doubtful. It is the settled rule that such a hospital is not liable
for the negligence of its physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients. 40
The theory of implied waiver which the Hordern case had adopted
was not applicable in this situation, since the unauthorized operation
constituted a trespass as to which there could be no such waiver. The
true ground for the defendant's exemption from liability was held to
be that the relation of the physician to the hospital was that of an
independent contractor rather than a servant. As far as the visiting
surgeon was concerned, there was ample justification for this ruling.
But the Court also refused to consider either house doctors or nurses
as servants of the hospital, declaring as to the latter:
... [N]urses are employed to carry out the orders of the physicians, to
whose authority they are subject. The hospital undertakes to procure for
the patient the services of a nurse. It does not undertake through the
agency of nurses to render those services itself .... The acts of preparation

immediately preceding the operation are necessary to its successful performance, and are really part of the operation itself....41
Of course, no one would argue that a hospital should be made liable
for the acts of a nurse in merely carrying out a doctor's orders. Indeed,
such an act, if carefully performed, could not be deemed negligence at
all. But what about the independent act of negligence of the nurse,
either in the manner of carrying out those orders or in the performance
of general nursing duties? Certainly the physician is not her master
in those instances, and he is not liable for such negligence.42 Assuredly,
unless the rule of respondeat superior is to be abandoned, her general
employer, the hospital, should be liable.42
As to the house doctor, the Court in the Schloendorff case found
that he, like the visiting physician, was "pursuing an independent calling,
a profession sanctioned by a solemn oath, and safeguarded by stringent
penalties. If, in serving their patient, they violated her commands, the
40 Id.

at 128, 105 N. E. at 93.

41 Id. at 132, 105 N. E. at 94.
42 Blackburn v. Baker, 227 App. Div. 588, 237 N. Y. Supp. 611 (3d Dep't 1929);
Guell v. Tenney, 262 Mass. 54, 159 N.E. 451 (1928) ; Perionowsky v. Freeman, 4 F. & F.
977 (1866).
42' For cases where private hospitals have been held liable for a nurse's negligence, see
Casey v. Beck, 58 Idaho 281, 72 P. 2d 856 (1937); Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145
So. 848 (1933). For authority for holding charitable hospitals liable in such situations,
see Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Silva v. Providence
Hospital of Oakland, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939); Mulliner v. Evangelischer
Diakonniessenverein, 114 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920).
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responsibility is not the defendant's; it is theirs. There is no distinction
between the visiting and the resident physicians."
Thus, the skill or profession of the doctor, not the fact of his employment, was made determinative of the question of whether he was in
fact a servant-a test which, as we have seen, is without legal or logical
basis. One might with equal justice say that the owner of any kind of
public transportation is not responsible as master for the acts of its
skilled employees engaged in flying its airplanes, driving its buses or
locomotives or sailing its ships; or that the employer of lawyers or
accountants would be free from responsibility for their negligence.
Authority for this interpretation of the legal position of house doctors
and nurses was derived by the court in the Schloendorff case in considerable measure from what had been said in the case of Glavin v. Rhode
Island Hospital, as well as from a contemporary English case, Hillyer v.
St. Bartholomew's Hospita4
The decision in the latter case was that
a patient could not recover against a hospital for acts of nurses or
orderlies who were merely carrying out the orders of the patient's own
operating surgeon in the operating room. It is true that the Hillyer
opinions contained a dictum which would indicate that a charitable
hospital was not liable generally for the negligence of its house doctors
or nurses, but this dictum had been clarified by the English courts before the Schloendorff case was decided.'
Although English law concerning this point has not always been clear,4 5 recent decisions clearly
hold that the Hillyer case is not authority for exemption for the negligence
of doctors or nurses, and that hospitals, both private and charitable, will
be held liable for the negligence of a house doctor or nurse in the performance of their general duties, under the rule of respondeat superior.4
The motivating theme of the Schloendorff opinion, however, appears
to manifest itself in the highly sympathetic expressions on the social
utility of charitable hospitals, for example:
43 L.

R. 2 K. B. 820 (1909).

See Smith v. Martin and Kingston-upon-Hull Corp., 2 K. B. 775 (1911) where
Farwell, L. J., whose opinion in the Hilyer case had been relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, said: "In Hiflye's case the nurse and carriers were treated as being servants
for whose acts the hospital would be liable, but the plaintiffs failed to prove any case
against them." (Emphasis added.) In other words the hospital was held not liable because it was not a negligent act for the nurses merely to carry out the orders of the visiting
surgeon.
45 See Strangways-Lesmere v. Clayton, 2 K. B. 11 .(1936); Wardell v. Kent County
Council, 54 T. L. R. 1026 (1938).
46 See Gold v. Essex County Council, 2 K. B. 293, 2 All Eng. Rep. 237 (1942), where
Lord Greene, M. R., says:
"Nursing, it appears to me, is just what the patient is entitled to expect from the
44
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A ruling would indeed be an unfortunate one that might constrain chari-,
table institutions, as a means of self-protection, to limit their activities.. .47
The fears thus expressed seem to lack foundation. Charitable hospitals

in those jurisdictions which refuse immunity have not been so constrained; 48 and, of course, insurance is available to cover such contingencies.
Is an interne an employee of a hospital for the purposes of workmen's

compensation, though the hospital would not be liable for his negligence
because of his status as an "independent contractor"? That was the
question presented to the Court of Appeals in Bernstein v. Beth Israel
Hospital,49 where an interne claimed the benefit of the Workmen's
Compensation Law as a result of injuries received by him while performing an autopsy in the defendant-hospital. The Court, per Cardozo,
J., held that he was such an employee and attempted to distinguish this
situation from the Schloendorff case by saying:
There the question arose, not between hospital and physician, but between hospital and patient. We held that a physician, while engaged in
the treatment of a patient, does not charge a public hospital with liability
for negligence or trespass. Such a hospital undertakes, not to heal or
attempt to heal through the agency of others, but merely to supply others
who will heal or attempt to, heal on their own responsibility. Liability
in such cases is to be determined by the contract, express or implied, between the hospital and patient. Liability in this case is to be determined
by the contract, express or implied, between hospital and physician. We
think the relation inter se is to be characterized as a relation of employment.
(Emphasis added.) 50
Observe (1) that the decision in the Schloendorff case is characterized
institution, and the relationship of the nurses to the institution supports the inference
that they are equipped to nurse the patients .... The idea that in the case of a
voluntary hospital the only obligation which the hospital undertakes to perform
by its nursing staff is, not the essential work of nursing, only so-called administrative
work, appears to me, with all respect to those who have thought otherwise, not merely
unworkable in practice, but contrary to the plain sense of the position. If correct,
it would mean that a hospital undertakes to carry up the patient's tea by its nurse
and is liable ifthe nurse negligently spills the hot water on the patient; but that the
true function of a nurse, namely that of nursing, is not one which the nurse is employed
to perform on behalf of the hospital. ..."
See also Goodhart, Hospitals and Trained Nurses, 54 L. Q. Rxv. 553 (1938).
47 211 N. Y. 125, 135, 105 N. E. 92, 95 (1914).
48 See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940) ; Mulliner v. Evangelischer
Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920); Welch v. Frisbie Memorial
Hospital, 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939).
49 236 N. Y. 268, 140 N. E. 694 (1923).
50 Id. at 270, 140 N. E. at 694.
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as applying only to public hospitals (2) that a contract is implied between a hospital and the patient, precluding liability-a theory since
completely disavowed, but unfortunately, without a disavowal of
these authorities.5 1 To hold that a person, while doing one specific
kind of work, can be an employee and yet not an employee at the same
moment, is an indication of the lengths to which the courts were forced
to go to justify arbitrary limitations of liability. Certainly a hospital
is more than mere walls and an administrative staff. The person who
avails himself of hospital facilities expects that it will attempt to cure
him, and does not expect the nurses and internes to act "on their own
responsibility."
The Schloendorff case had expressly stated that a hospital would be
liable for the negligent act of an orderly,5 2 but an important qualification
was added to this illustration in Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital.'
There, plaintiff was burned by a hot water bottle which an orderly had
negligently placed against her while she was unconscious following an
operation. The court determined that the nature of the act, not-the skill
or profession of the person performing it (which originally had been
the basis for limiting liability), decided the question of the hospital's
lability or immunity. Judgment was awarded in favor of the charitable
hospital, and in holding that negligence in the course of medical treatment was not imputable to the hospital, Judge Pound, speaking for
the court, said:
The distinction is sought to be made between exoneration from liability
for the negligence of physicians and nurses employed by the hospital to
care for its patients and for the negligence of cooks, maids and orderlies
who also act for the hospital in its care of patients. It is difficult to
place such distinction on the unshifting rock. If a nurse should carelessly apply one hot water bottle and an orderly apply another to the same
patient at the same time, and two burns were thus produced, it would
require an acute mind to formulate satisfactorily the rule of liability
which would exempt the hospital in the one case and hold it in the other.P
The paradoxical result was that a hospital could not be held liable for
any acts of its servants, whether professionally skilled or not, provided
their acts were directly connected with curing the patientl
The principle of the Phillips case found further application the next
year in Hamburgerv. Cornell Universityl where a charitable university
51 See Sheehan. v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. 2d 28
(1937).
52 211 N. Y. 125, 132, 105 N. E. 92, 94 (1914).
53 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924).
54 Id. at 190, 146 N. E. at 200.
55 240 N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 539 (1925).
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was exempted from liability for the errors of its professors, instructors
and other members of its teaching staff. It was alleged in the Hamburger
case that an instructor had distributed an incorrect chemical to his class
for a laboratory experiment which later exploded in a student's face,
causing the loss of an eye. Again Judge Cardozo spoke for the court,
saying:
We think a hospital's immunity from liability for the errors of surgeons
and physicians is matched in the case of a university by a like immunity
from liability for the errors of professors or instructors or other members
of its staff of teachers ....

The governing body of a university makes no

attempt to control its professors and instructors as if they were its servants.
By practice and tradition, the members of the faculty are masters, and
not servants, in the conduct of the classroom. They have the independence
appropriate to a company of scholars. ....

.6

But respondeat superior does not depend upon the exercise of control.
It arises from the assumption of an obligation-in this instance, the
obligation to instruct with due care, and, in the case of a hospital, the
obligation to attempt to cure. Surely, lack of "control" would have
been no excuse if a stranger had been injured by the explosion. In an
analogous situation where a teacher had instructed a child in poking
a fire, resulting in injuries to the child, an English court held that the
relation of master and servant did exist and that the respondeat superior
theory should be applied with full force and vigor. 7
With the trust fund theory effectively rejected and the implied waiver
theory questioned, it is difficult to understand the repeated references
to the charitable nature of an institution as granting it a special immunity. For instance, the court in the Hamburger case states:
With us, a hospital or university owes to patients or to students whatever
duty of care and diligence is attached to the relation as reasonably implicit in the nature of the undertaking and the purpose of the charity58
If one undertakes to give medical treatment, or to teach, it should be
reasonably implicit that one undertakes to do it carefully, regardless of
its charitable nature.
The question whether a charitable institution could be held liable
to a beneficiary for the torts of its ordinary servants and employees was
conclusively answered in Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital 5 9 Plaintiff, a pay-patient in defendant charitable hospital was
GOId. at 337, 148 N. E. at 542.
57 See Smith v. Martin and Kingston-upon-HuU Corp., 2 K. B. 775 (1911).

44, supra.
68 240 N. Y. 328, 338, 148 N. E. 539, 542 (1925).
69 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. 2d 28 (1937).

See note
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injured while being driven home in defendant's ambulance when its
driver negligently collided with another vehicle. The court, in awarding
judgment for the plaintiff, explicitly rejected the implied waiver theory,
asserting the doctrine was a fiction, and stated:
"

. .

that to impose liability is to beget careful management and that no

conception of justice demands that an exception to the rule of respondeat
superior be made in favor of the resources of charity and against the person
of a beneficiary injured by the tort of a mere servant or employee functioning in that character....60

Mention was also made of the fact that the public policy of the state
favored this trend because the state had withdrawn its own exemption
from tort liability, and that a harmonious policy would require that
charities be given no greater immunity than the state.
The effect of this decision was not as sweeping as might be supposed.
For one thing, it merely held that a hospital or other charitable institution could be sued by a beneficiary for the acts of negligence of its
ordinary servants or employees, and the question of liability for the
negligence of doctors, nurses and other skilled employees was left untouched. Subsequent cases have shown judicial adherence to the theory
that liability must depend on the nature of the act of negligence, continuing to hold that if it be an act connected with the treatment of a
patient, liability on the part of the hospital does not exist unless the act is
what is known as an administrative act.
THm NATURE OF THE ACT OR OMIssION

The distinction made in the Phillips case between the acts of ordinary
servants or employees and the torts of persons engaged in special duties
of a more responsible nature is the law of New York today. This kind
of differentiation has led to strange and unpredictable results. As far
as hospitals are concerned, it is accepted that the status of the tortfeasor is "determined by the nature of the work he is employed to do
'
rather than the payroll designation of his position."61
When this test
was applied in the Phillips case, a hospital was held not liable for the
misfeasance of an orderly in applying a scalding hot water bottle to a
patient. In a more recent application of this test, in Dillon v. Rockaway
Beach Hoipital,62 the defendant hospital was held liable to a patient
who was burned by an electric light negligently left under the sheets
by-an attendant making the bed. The act of making a bed was of the
60 Id. at 166, 7 N. E. 2d at 29.
61 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 190, 146 N. E. 199, 200 (1924).
62 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940).
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kind performed by a servant, and the court emphasized that the crucial
inquiry was to be addressed to the character of the act itself, not the
general nature of the work for which the tortfeasor had been employed.'
The test which evolved from the Phillips and Dillon decisions has
found continued application in subsequent cases. The negligent use of
hot water bottles is a favorite subject of this type of litigation. The
general holding has been that the negligence is in the course of treatment where the scalding hot water bottle is applied to the patient's
body, and therefore the hospital is not liable; 6 4 but this same act has
been held an administrative one with liability imposed on the hospital
where a nurse had placed a hot water bottle in bed prior to the reception of the patient.' The distinction is a tenuous one at best and is
neither realistic nor workable.
Another recurring situation is one where hospital personnel have failed
to place sideboards on the bed or to take special precautions to protect
a delirious or restless patient from rolling out of bed. Again, fine distinction have been drawn-such nonfeasance is considered of a medical
or professional nature which exempts the hospital from liability,6" but
the result is otherwise where a doctor or head nurse sees the danger
and orders a subordinate to install sideboards or to protect the patient
in other ways.67
Where a nurse and an interne mistakenly administered a blood transfusion to the wrong patient, the court-held the hospital liable, reasoning
that the professional nature of the employees' duties ceased upon their
entry into the wrong room. 68 If the same interne and the same nurse had
63 Id. at 180, 30 N. E. 2d at 374.
64 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924); Sutherland v. N. Y. Polyclinic Hospital, 273 App. Div. 29, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 135 (1st Dep't 1947);
Kaps v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 791 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County' 1944).
65 lacano v. N. Y. Polyclinic Hospital, 269 App. Div. 955, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (2d Dep't
1945), aff'd inem., 296 N. Y. 502, 68 N. E. 2d 450 (1946).
06 Lee v. Glen Falls Hospital, 265 App. Div. 607, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 169 (3d Dep't 1943),
aff'd mein., 291 N. Y. 526, 50 N. E. 2d 651 (1943); Pierson v. Charles S. Wilson Memorial
Hospital, Inc., 273 App. Div. 348, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 146 (3d Dep't 1948). But cf. Bickford
and Carson v. Peck Memorial Hospital, 266 App. Div. 875, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 20 (2d Dep't
1943); Petry v. Nassau Hospital, 267 App. Div. 996, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (2d Dep't 1944).
67 Ranelli v. Society of N. Y. Hospital, 269 App. Div. 906, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 481 (2d
Dep't 1945), aff'd mem., 295 N.Y. 850, 67 N.E. 2d 257 (1946); Grace v. Manhattan
Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, 276 App. Div. 955, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 185 (1st Dep't), aff'd tnem.,
301 N. Y. 660, 93 N. E. 2d 926 (1950); Gordon v. Harbor Hospital Inc., 275 App. Div.
1047, 92 N.Y.S.2d 101 (2d Dep't 1949); Pivar v. Manhattan General, Inc., 110 N.Y.S.
2d 786 (1st Dep't 1952).
68 Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital, 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 832 (4th Dep't
1946), afJ'd without opinion, 296 N. Y. 936, 73 N. E. 2d 117 (1947). See also Lainen v.
Tonsil Hospital, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 55 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1942) where it was held a
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administered the wrong blood to a patient supposed to receive a transfusion, that apparently would have been categorized as a medical act
for which the hospital would not be liable. Such distinctions make legal
concepts meaningless.
Another group of cases involves the negligence of hospital personnel
in dispensing drugs and medicines. In Volk v. City of New York, 9 a
nurse under medical treatment was given a deleterious medicine; yet this
was termed an administrative act and the hospital was held liable because there was concurring negligence by the supervising nurse who had
failed to destroy the medicine. Administrative negligence was dlso found
in Luibowsky v. State of New York7 ° where a patient was given the
wrong drug through the negligence of the pharmacist in the general employ of the state hospital. Both the Volk and Luibowsky cases concerned
publicly-owned hospitals and the decisions might be explained, although
not justified, on the ground of allegedly broader liability imposed upon
such hospitals. The Luibowsky opinion argued that the Schloendorff
case did not govern the liability of a state-owned hospital because at the
time the latter case was decided the state had not assumed responsibility
for the torts of its officers and employees; the court therefore held
Section 12-a of the Court of Claims Act controlling, which provided
that the doctrine of respondeat superior should be applicable to the
state, thereby making the distinctions applied in other cases unnecessary.
New York courts might take notice of a recent English decision"
which examines once more the status of physicians and concludes that
hospitals should be liable for the negligence of resident house physicians.
The test laid down by the court was whether the negligent physicians
were performing their duties under a contract for service or a contract
of service. If the former, they are considered independent contractors
and the hospital is not liable. It seems reasonable that such a distinction should be made in determining a hospital's liability, but New
York has refused to recognize such a difference. The Court of Appeals
from
has said: "Whether the hospital undertakes to procure a physician
72
afar, or to have one on the spot, its liability remains the same."
question of fact for the jury whether the premature discharge of an infant from the hospital was an administrative or medical default.
69 284 N. Y. 279, 30 N. E. 2d 596 (1940).
70 260 App. Div. 416, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 633 (3d Dep't 1940), aff'd men., 285 N. Y. 701,
34 N. E. 2d 385 (1941).
71 Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council 1 All Eng. Rep. 633 (1947).
72 Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 132, 105 N. E. 92, 94 (1914).
This statement was made on the authority of the Hillyer case, which the English courts do
not accept as authority for this proposition. See notes 46 and 71 supra.
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There are, of course, certain acts for which a hospital cannot escape
responsibility and in these situations a consideration of the above distinctions is unimportant. Such acts, for example, include a failure to
employ competent personnel73 and negligence in procuring safe equipment or facilities. 4
LIABILITY OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS

Because of the obvious inapplicability of the trust fund and implied
waiver theories, there was little difficulty in holding a private hospital
liable for the torts of its administrative personnel.75 The courts encountered more difficulty, however, when they considered the question
of the liability of a private hospital for the negligence of the nurses and
doctors on its staff. A divergence of opinion resulted in the lower courts,
one view holding that the Schloendorff rule, exempting hospitals from
liability for the negligence of its doctors and nurses while acting in their
professional capacities, applied only to charitable institutions. 6 This
viewpoint accorded the nurses and internes the status of servants of the
hospital. Other cases interpreted the Schloendorff decision as applying
to all hospitals, whether private or charitable.77 Steinert v. Brunswick
Home Inc. 8 is an example of the latter view. A patient was denied
73 White v. Prospect Heights Hospital, 278 App. Div. 790, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 860 (2d
Dep't 1951); Howe v. Medical Arts Center, 261 App. Div. 1088, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 957 (2d
Dep't 1941), aff'd tnem., 287 N. Y. 698, 39 N. E. 2d 303 (1942); Roewekamp v. N. Y.
Post Graduate Medical School & Hospital, 254 App. Div. 265, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 751 (2d
Dep't 1938), rev'd on appeal, 256 App. Div. 957, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 669 (2d Dep't 1939)
(on the ground that the conclusion that the defendant should have known of doctor's
incompetence was unwarranted by the evidence).
74 Woodhouse v. Knickerbocker Hospital, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 671 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County
1943).

75

Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N. Y. 252, 11 N. E. 2d 899 (1937); Van Patter v.

Towns Hospital, 213 App. Div. 863, 209 N. Y. Supp. 935 (1st Dep't 1925), aff'd mrem.,
246 N. Y. 646, 159 N. E. 686 (1927).
76 Meshel v. Crotona Park Sanitorium, Inc., 154 Misc. 221, 276 N. Y. Supp. 989 (City
Ct. Bronx County 1935); Post v. Crown Heights Hospital, 173 Misc. 250, 17 N. Y. S. 2d
409 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1940). See also Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y.
244, 60 N. E. 597 (1901), where the Court of Appeals held an employer of a dentist
liable to a patient for malpractice. When the question was examined free of the charitable
nature of the employer, and considered solely as a question of master and servant, there
was no hesitation in holding that the dentist, though a skilled professional man, was the
servant for whose malpractice the employer was liable.
77 Kamps v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 251 App. Div. 849, 296 N. Y. Supp. 776
(2d Dep't 1939), aff'd nzem., 277 N. Y. 602, 14 N. E. 2d 184 (1938); Steinert v. Brunswick
Home, Inc., 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1939), aff'd mem.,
259 App. Div. 1018, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 459 (2d Dep't 1940).
78 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1939), aff'd mem., 259
App. Div. 1018, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 459 (2d Dep't 1940), leave to appeal denied, 284 N. Y.
822, 31 N. E. 2d 517 (1940).
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recovery for injuries received when a nurse in the employ of a private
hospital negligently handed the wrong solution to the operating doctor.
The court held that there was no logical distinction between private
and charitable hospitals, in that both merely undertook to supply doctors
and nurses who would treat patients on their own responsibility; therefore, the distinctions discussed above between medical and administrative
torts were applied.
The position taken in the Steinert case was followed by the Appellate
Division in Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium.9 In the Bakal case,
the plantiff, while being prepared for an operation, was burned by an
electric plate which had been negligently applied by a nurse regularly
employed by defendant private hospital. The Appellate Division was
squarely faced with the issue whether or not a private hospital operated
for profit is liable for a nurse's negligent acts which are related to a
patient's medical care. The Schloendorff case was relied upon as exempting private hospitals from such liability, and judgment was awarded
to the defendant.
As a matter of law, the author does not believe that the Schloendorff
decision intended to exempt private as well as charitable hospitals from
liability for the torts of doctors, internes, and nurses in their treatment
of patients." But granting the premise that a charitable hospital is not
within the rule of respondeatsuperior in determining liability for medical
torts, it would seem that, as a matter of logic, the same thing should hold
true in regard to private hospitals. But that result should be a caveat that
the premise itself is wrong. To grant a business enterprise an exemption
from responsibility for the acts of the very persons who are employed to
further its purposes is to make a mockery of the principle of respondeat
superior. To grant such exemption for the negligent treatment of a
patient who enters a hospital expecting the expert care implicit in the
very word "hospital" is to perpetrate a cruel jest.
Those states which have shielded charitable institutions from tort
liability have at the same time held private hospitals fully responsible
for the same acts. 1 In supporting such a result, a Virginia court has
said:
79 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 385 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd without opinion, 302
N. Y. 870, 100 N. E. 2d 51 (1951). The Appellate Division was divided 3-2. See note 1
suspra.
80 See quotation cited in note 40 supra. Judge Cardozo, in writing the Schloendorff
opinion, made it clear that the defendant was being excused from liability because of
its charitable nature.
81 See Mahoney v. Harley Private Hospital, 279 Mass. 96, 180 N. E. 723 (1932);
Tulsa Hospital Association v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 175 Pac. 519 (1918); Stuart Circle
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The object, aim and purpose of a hospital, the reason for its establishment and operation, is to render and perform medical treatment and
nursing of a skilled character. It is the facility for affording the patient
a higher and greater degree of nursing and medical attention than would
be ordinarily possible outside of a hospital that makes it desirable. The
opportunity to render such service enables a hospital to make a higher
charge than a hotel or boarding house. The desirability of securing the
medical service provides inducement for the patient to enter the hospital.
The patient comes to the hospital for advice, aid and treatment .... 82
A paradoxical situation is the result. In those jurisdictions where the
principle of complete immunity for charitable institutions was first introduced, private hospitals are fully liable for the torts of those employed
to carry out their work, whether professional or administrative. In
"liberal" states, such as New York, which have rejected all the theories
granting such exemption as unsound, private hospitals have been able
to hide behind a fiction invoked to protect charitable institutions, namely,
that persons performing services which require professional skill are not
servants of the hospital but rather independent contractors.
CONCLUSION

It seems superfluous today to argue that no special privilege of immunity should attach to a hospital merely because of its charitable nature. Concepts of what is owed the poor have changed since Charles
Dickens' time, when this question of exemption first arose. The assets
of a charity are in little danger of being despoiled by law suits, for they
can be adequately protected by insurance. Even if there were such a
danger, the more important consideration should be the protection of
the patient where the hospital is negligent. To exempt such institutions
from liability, even partially, is to put a premium on negligence and
negate the very meaning of charity.
Public policy in the United States has shown a definite trend away
from such immunity, as illustrated by the withdrawal of the Federal
Government,'e New York, 4 and other states of their exemption from suit.
Cities in New York may now be sued for the negligence of voluntary
doctors serving in city hospitals.8 This was undoubtedly done for the
Hospital v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153 (1939). See also cases collected in 22
A. L. R. 333 (1923), 39 A. L. R. 1432 (1925), 124 A. L. R. 186 (1940), AM. Juir., Hospitals
§ 814.
82 Stuart Circle Hospital v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153 (1939).
83 U. S. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 931 (1946).
S4 N. Y. Court of Claims Act, § 12a, N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 860.
85 GENAL Mu-NIcIPAL LAws, § 50-d, N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 483 as amended by N. Y.
Laws 1950, c. 681. See Schmid v. Werner, 277 App. Div. 520, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 860 (1st
Dep't 1950), leave to appeal granted, 98 N. E. 2d 109 (1951).
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protection of such doctors, but the peculiar result is that those hospitals
may now be sued for the acts of doctors not in their employ and not for
the acts of doctors or nurses who are in their employ.
The law of New York today holds a hospital liable whether private
or charitable, for those torts of servants and employees which may be
characterized as administrative acts, but not liable for those torts
which are of a medical nature. These distinctions were the result of a
judicial policy of compromise between the doctrines of respondeat superior and total immunity for charitable institutions. Neither modern
trends nor modern conditions justify these distinctions, and they have
done little but add confusion to the state of the law. There is no
reason to continue the exemption for these institutions, whether
charitable or profit-making, from the ordinary rule that a master is
liable for the torts of his servants and employees, committed in the
scope of their employment.
Recently, the Court of Appeals, in upsetting a precedent of many
years which had denied a remedy for pre-natal injuries, said that the
question is whether courts shall follow such a precedent, or shall "bring
the common law of this state, on this question, into accord with justice." 6
It decided to make the law conform to right.
It should do no less in the specific field which this article has explored.
86

Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. 2d 691 (1951).

